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Abstract
From the early 1970s onward, inter-Korean relations have moved fitfully and 
gradually toward greater contact and mutual recognition, a process which has 
accelerated since the end of the 1990s. As Korean division and inter-Korean 
conflict were products of Great Power politics and the Cold War, movement in 
inter-Korean relations was largely the result of changes in Great Power relations 
during the Cold War period. However, since the end of the Cold War, the major 
impetus in inter-Korean relations has shifted toward an internally driven 
dynamic on the Korean Peninsula itself, especially under the initiative of South 
Korea. At the present time, inter-Korean relations are dominated by this internal 
dynamic. At the same time, however, they remain constrained and limited by 
external forces, in particular the nuclear confrontation between North Korea and 
the United States. While the two Koreas have moved toward a position of de 
facto peaceful coexistence, further integration between the two is necessarily 
linked to resolution of these external conflicts as well as greater integration 
among the countries of Northeast Asia.
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From the time the two contemporary Korean states were founded 
in 1948, they have vied with each other for domestic legitimacy and 
international recognition. The devastating war between the two in 
1950-3 intensified rather than resolved these rival claims, and the 
competition for legitimacy between Seoul and Pyongyang remained 
fierce for decades after the Korean War. However, from the early 
1970s onward, inter-Korean relations have moved fitfully and gradually 
toward greater contact and mutual recognition, a process which has 
accelerated since the end of the 1990s. As Korean division and 
inter-Korean conflict were products of Great Power politics and the 
Cold War, movement in inter-Korean relations was largely the result 
of changes in Great Power relations during the Cold War period. 
However, since the end of the Cold War, the major impetus in 
inter-Korean relations has shifted toward an internally driven 
dynamic on the Korean Peninsula itself, especially under the initiative 
of South Korea. At the present time, inter-Korean relations are 
dominated by this internal dynamic. At the same time, however, they 
remain constrained and limited by external forces, in particular the 
nuclear confrontation between North Korea and the United States. 
While the two Koreas have moved toward a position of de facto 
peaceful coexistence, further integration between the two is 
necessarily linked to resolution of these external conflicts as well as 
greater integration among the countries of Northeast Asia.
Seoul-Pyongyang relations have evolved through four stages: 
The first stage, characterized by a zero-sum game of mutual antagonism, 
ended with the July 4 Communiqué of 1972, on the basis of which 
Seoul and Pyongyang for the first time established official contacts. 
The 1972 breakthrough in inter-Korean relations was a direct result of 
a dramatic change in the configuration of Cold War dynamics in the 
East Asian region: Rapprochement between the United States and 
China, the main Great Power allies of South and North Korea, 
respectively. The second stage, a period of on-again, off-again talks 
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and exchanges, culminated in the Agreement on Reconciliation, 
Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation (Basic Agreement) of 
December 1991, the Agreement on Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula in February 1992, and the entry of the two Korean states 
simultaneously into the United Nations in September 1992. This 
second-stage set of agreements also resulted from changes in the Cold 
War environment, including the development of economic and 
diplomatic ties between South Korea and the communist countries of 
Eastern Europe and Asia, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and indeed 
the end of the global Cold War itself.
The third and fourth stages of inter-Korean relations have been 
driven more by internal dynamics on the Korean Peninsula itself, 
albeit inevitably linked to external factors. In the 1990s, after a period 
of severe domestic crisis in North Korea coinciding with a nuclear 
stand-off with the United States, a third stage began with the tentative 
opening of North Korea to external economic and political forces, 
culminating in the historic June 2000 summit meeting between North 
Korean leader Kim Jong Il and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung. 
Whereas the breakthrough of the early 1990s had been preceded by the 
establishment of new links between South Korea and the communist 
bloc, strongly (if fruitlessly) resisted by the North, this time South 
Korea encouraged North Korea’s openness to Western capitalist 
countries. However, this process reached an impasse when North 
Korea’s cautiously evolving relations with Japan and the United 
States were halted by, respectively, the dispute over Japanese citizens 
abducted by North Koreans in the 1970s and 1980s, and a renewed 
crisis over North Korea’s nuclear program that emerged in the fall of 
2002. 
Finally, inter-Korean relations appear to be moving toward a 
fourth stage, a period of intensifying economic linkages on the Korean 
Peninsula within the broader framework of an evolving regional 
dialogue among the two Koreas, Russia, China, Japan, and the United 
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States, partners in the Six-Party Talks that began in Beijing in 2003. 
Although progress in the Six-Party Talks has been slow and 
inconclusive thus far, a peaceful and definitive resolution of the 
nuclear crisis could establish the basis for a stable regional security 
environment within which the two halves of divided Korea can 
become increasingly integrated. Much remains to be done to resolve 
the security question and especially US-North Korean confrontation, 
but despite these unresolved issues, inter-Korean relations are now 
more extensive and advanced than at any time in the history of divided 
Korea. Barring an unexpected calamity on the Peninsula  the sudden 
collapse of the North Korean regime, military confrontation between 
the US and North Korea, renewed war  the trend toward greater 
interaction, interdependence, and integration between the two Koreas 
will continue. Unification as such, however, may yet be many years 
away.
The Politics of Existential Antagonism, 1948-1972
Before and after the Korean War, inter-Korean relations were 
characterized by what could be called “existential antagonism”: Each 
Korean state saw the very existence of its rival as a threat to its own 
existence, and held as its explicit goal the elimination of the other. For 
the South, North Korea was an illegitimate and threatening regime 
that needed to be defended against at all cost. North Korea viewed 
South Korea as a weak and unstable regime that would collapse its 
own contradictions sooner or later, so therefore the North should bide 
its time and be prepared to move in and reunify the country when the 
opportunity presented itself. However, an outright invasion of the 
South, along the lines of June 1950, was never again attempted, for 
two reasons: The clear US commitment to the defense of South Korea, 
and the unwillingness of the USSR and China to support such a 
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venture. 
In the area of inter-Korean relations, both Koreas at this time 
practiced their version of West Germany’s Hallstein Doctrine or 
China’s policy toward the Republic of China on Taiwan: Refusal to 
recognize the rival state’s existence or to maintain diplomatic ties with 
any foreign country that recognized it. Both Koreas were entrenched 
in their respective Cold War blocs, which reinforced the North-South 
Korean confrontation and inhibited North-South contact. This 
external environment changed dramatically in the early 1970s, when 
the Nixon Administration made secret, and then public, overtures 
toward normalization with the People’s Republic of China, North 
Korea’s closest supporter. To preempt abandonment by their 
respective patrons, the two Koreas took matters into their own hands 
and began direct negotiations with each other, first through their 
respective Red Cross committees and then through a series of 
meetings between North and South Korean intelligence officers. Just 
under a year after Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing on July 9, 
1971, Seoul and Pyongyang issued a Joint Communiqué on July 4, 
1972, outlining their principles for peaceful unification.
Toward Cautious Coexistence, 1972-1992
The new movement in inter-Korean relations inaugurated by the 
July 4 Communiqué raised tremendous expectations in both the North 
and the South, but produced little in the way of concrete result. After 
a half-dozen meetings of the newly created South-North Coordinating 
Committee, the two sides reached an impasse and the North cut off 
talks in mid-1973.1 North-South Red Cross dialogue was revived in 
1Chuck Downs, “Discerning North Korea’s Intentions,” in Nicholas Eberstadt and 
Richard J. Ellings (ed.), Korea’s Future and the Great Powers (Seattle, WA: The 
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001), p. 96.
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the mid-1980s and there was a brief flurry of cultural exchanges and 
visits of separated families in 1985, but this too quickly fizzled out. 
The next breakthrough in official inter-Korean relations would not 
come until the beginning of the 1990s, by which time the international 
environment had changed drastically, to the benefit of the South and 
the great detriment of the North.
The growing economic strength of South Korea in the 1980s 
found diplomatic expression in the Northern Policy or Nordpolitik of 
President Roh Tae Woo in the latter part of the decade. Focused on 
wooing North Korea’s communist allies into economic and political 
relations with the ROK, and modeled on West Germany’s Ostpolitik 
toward East Germany and the Soviet bloc, Nordpolitik was extremely 
successful at establishing ties between South Korea and the communist 
countries in Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union itself, which 
recognized the ROK in 1990. For the North, Roh outlined a broad 
vision of inter-Korean cooperation, and ultimately unification, into 
what he called a “Korean National Community.”2 The main North 
Korean proposal for unification, to which Roh’s proposal was in part 
a response, was a “Confederation” of the two existing political 
systems on the Korean Peninsula, first outlined in 1980. While 
initially presented as a sudden union of the two system, over time the 
North has shown flexibility in its Confederation proposal, willing to 
see confederation not as the end-goal of unification but a transitory 
institution and giving more rights to the two “regional governments.” 
By 1991, in fact, North Korean officials including Kim Il Sung were 
suggesting that there was room for negotiation with the South on the 
form of confederation and that both sides within a confederated 
Korean system could have considerable autonomy even in its foreign 
2B. C. Koh, “A Comparison of Unification Policies,” in Young Whan Kihl (ed.), 
Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 
156.
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relations, under the general rubric of military and diplomatic unity.3 
This proposed “Confederal Republic of Koryo” was thus not 
dissimilar to Roh’s “Korean National Community.” Both proposals, 
however, remained fairly abstract; on the ground, inter-Korean relations 
moved cautiously toward government-to-government contacts.
As the 1990s dawned, high-level North-South talks began again. 
In December 1991, the fifth in this series of high-level talks produced 
an Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and 
Cooperation, or “Basic Agreement.”4 This agreement was the most 
important declaration of North-South cooperation and coexistence 
since the 1972 Joint Communiqué, and was far more detailed than the 
1972 agreement had been. It was followed in February 1992 by a joint 
“Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Once 
again, hopes were high for a major change in North-South relations 
and for a new momentum toward reconciliation and eventual 
unification. But once again such hopes would be unfulfilled. Regional 
and global circumstances had shifted dramatically, and the very survival 
of the North Korean regime became Pyongyang’s preoccupation. 
Movement toward inter-Korean reconciliation would be postponed as 
North Korea went through a series of profound crises. The collapse of 
every communist state in Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991, 
including the USSR itself, came as a deep shock to North Korea and 
deprived Pyongyang of most of its important trade partners, political 
supporters and allies. Even before the communist collapse, East 
European countries had begun to normalize relations with the ROK; 
by 1992, Russia and even North Korea’s allegedly staunch ally China 
had established diplomatic relations with Seoul. It would take almost 
3Selig Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and US Disengage-
ment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 76.
4 “The Politics of Inter-Korean Relations: Coexistence or Reunification,” in Kihl 
(ed.), Korea and the World, p. 135.
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a decade for a reciprocal movement of Western countries normalizing 
ties with Pyongyang. Economically, South Korea had long since leapt 
almost unimaginably beyond the level of the DPRK. Far from the 
Basic Agreement ushering in a new age of equality between the two 
Koreas, the times seemed to call into question the continued ability of 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to exist at all. 
Movement in inter-Korean relations seemed almost a moot point. 
German-style unification, with the South absorbing the North as West 
Germany had absorbed East Germany in 1990, was widely predicted, 
especially by Western analysts.5
Nuclear Crisis, Economic Catastrophe, and the Politics of 
“Sunshine”
The 1990s were a decade of disaster for the DPRK, beginning 
with the collapse of every communist state in Eastern Europe, 
proceeding to a crisis over international inspections of DPRK nuclear 
energy facilities that nearly led to war with the US in June 1994, the 
death of Kim Il Sung in July, and finally a series of natural calamities 
that pushed North Korea’s ever-precarious food situation into 
full-scale famine.6 North Korea spent most of the decade simply 
trying to cope with these multiple crises, and its leadership seemed 
unsure of where to take the country. Meanwhile, many in the outside 
world expected an inevitable collapse of the DPRK. 
The threat to the DPRK’s very existence in the 1990s was greater 
than at any time since the Korean War. North Korea’s response was to 
batten down the hatches and proclaim its continued adherence to 
5See for example Nick Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (Washington, DC: AEI 
Press, 1999).
6See Andrew Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine: Famine, Politics, and 
Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001).
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“socialism.”7 Pyongyang for the most part played a waiting game, 
maintaining the system while hoping for the “correlation of forces” to 
become more favorable toward the DPRK. As Paul Bracken has 
explained, the North Korean nuclear program was a way for the 
DPRK to “buy time for the regime to adapt to new international 
circumstances.”8 Bracken argues that the nuclear program was a 
defensive, even desperate attempt at ensuring state survival in an 
environment suddenly much more hostile. In this case the gamble 
almost backfired, as the US and North Korea came to the brink of war 
in June 1994, averted at the eleventh hour by the visit of former US 
President Carter to Pyongyang and discussions with Kim Il Sung that 
led, finally, to the US-DPRK Agreed Framework of October 1994. 
By the late 1990s the domestic situation had somewhat improved. 
The economy, which had fallen precipitously throughout the 1990s, 
appeared to turn around at the very end of the decade, due in 
considerable measure to a sharp increase in foreign aid following the 
natural disasters of 1995-7. According to ROK Bank of Korea 
estimates, the North Korean GDP had been consistently negative from 
1990 to 1999, reaching as low as minus 6% in 1992 and minus 6.3% 
in 1997. In 1999, GDP was above zero for the first time in a decade, 
at 6.2%, and remained positive in subsequent years.9 At the same time, 
Kim Jong Il made public the consolidation of his political rule. Three 
years after the death of his father, the younger Kim was named 
General Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party in 1997, and the 
following year was re-appointed Chairman of the National Defense 
7Charles K. Armstrong, “A Socialism of Our Style: North Korean Ideology in a 
Post-Communist Era,” in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), North Korean Foreign Policy in the 
Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
8Paul Bracken, “The North Korean Nuclear Program as a Problem of State 
Survival,” in Andrew Mack (ed.), Asian Flashpoint: Security and the Korean 
Peninsula (New York: Allen & Unwin, 1993), p. 86.
9Cited in Korea Economic Institute, “North Korean Economic Data,” http://www. 
keia.org/, accessed on December 15, 2005.
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Committee, putting him firmly at the apex of the North Korean power 
structure. By 1998 the “Arduous March” through hunger and distress 
was declared over, and the new slogans of the DPRK were Kangsong 
Taeguk (“Rich, Powerful and Great Country,” or simply “Powerful 
Nation”) and Songun chongch’i (Military-first Politics).10 No longer 
preoccupied with sheer survival, North Korea in the new millennium 
could return to inter-Korean relations with a modicum of internal 
strength and unity. 
Meanwhile, South Korea had come some distance since the 
early 1990s, when the Kim Young-Sam government viewed US- 
North Korean negotiation over the Agreed Framework with suspicion 
and concern. President Kim Dae Jung, elected at the end of 1997, 
considered improvement of North-South relations as one of his 
highest priorities in office. Kim stressed that his Administration 
would actively pursue inter-Korean dialogue and exchanges in a wide 
range of fields, including culture, trade, tourism, family exchanges, 
and humanitarian assistance. In particular, Kim focused on increasing 
inter-Korean economic relations, separating the economic from the 
political, in the hopes of encouraging greater openness and economic 
development within North Korea itself.11 President Kim stepped up 
South Korean trade with the North, which had grown steadily since 
1991, and lifted restrictions on South Korean investment in North 
Korea in March-April 1998. By 2001, South Korea was North Korea’s 
largest trading partner after China.12
Kim’s policy of stepping up economic and cultural ties with 
10These two “guiding principles” have been elaborated at length in, respectively, 
Sahoejuui kangsong taeguk konsol sasang (The Ideology of Constructing a 
Powerful Socialist Nation), (Pyongyang: Sahoe Kwahak Ch’ulp’ansa, 2000) and 
Kim Chong-il Changgunui songun chongch’i (General Kim Jong Il’s Military- 
First Politics), (Pyongyang: Pyongyang Ch’ulp’ansa, 2000).
11Yung-Sup Han, Peace and Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula (Seoul: 
Kyungnam University Press, 2005), p. 209.
12Korea Economic Institute, “North Korean Economic Data.”
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North Korea in the hopes that positive inducements would encourage 
internal reform and inter-Korean dialogue, dubbed the “Sunshine 
Policy,” put Seoul in the lead in engagement with North Korea. The 
Clinton Administration in the US, despite the 1994 Agreed Framework, 
moved slowly and sporadically toward normalization with Pyongyang, 
not least because of a highly critical, Republican-controlled Congress. 
A crisis over North Korea’s test-firing of a missile over Japan led to a 
new crisis in US-DPRK relations in 1998, which led to a renewed 
attempt at engagement. American engagement with Pyongyang 
reached a peak in the fall of 2000, when North Korean Vice Marshal 
Jo Myong-rok, the de facto number-two ruler in Pyongyang, met with 
President Clinton in Washington. Shortly thereafter Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright met Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang. The two sides 
renewed their commitment to work toward normal relations, and 
North Korea appeared to be on the verge of agreeing to curtail its 
missile development and exports, one of Washington’s chief concerns. 
However, such promises could not come to fruition before Clinton left 
office, and the Bush victory in the 2000 presidential election 
effectively halted US momentum toward normalization with the 
DPRK.
Inter-Korean Relations and the United States 
The new millennium began with the third major symbolic 
breakthrough in inter-Korean relations, the Kim Jong Il-Kim Dae 
Jung summit in Pyongyang in June 2000. At the same time, with 
Seoul’s encouragement, North Korea began to emerge from its 
diplomatic isolation. In the space of two years, Pyongyang established 
diplomatic relations with most countries in Western Europe and 
Southeast Asia, along with Canada, Australia, the Philippines, Brazil, 
and New Zealand; in July 2000, North Korea joined the ASEAN 
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Regional Forum (ARF) for East Asian security dialogue.13 Meanwhile, 
North Korea began to make cautious but potentially far-reaching steps 
toward internal economic reform, including unprecedented wage and 
price reforms undertaken in the summer of 2002.14 Improvement in 
inter-Korean relations was part and parcel of this trend toward North 
Korea becoming a more “normal” country.
While North-South Korean relations were on a generally 
upward trend, US-North Korean relations took a decided turn for the 
worse after George W. Bush became president. Bush condemned 
North Korea as part of an “Axis of Evil,” along with Iran and Iraq, in 
his State of the Union address in January 2002. North Korea 
responded with predictable outrage. A Foreign Ministry spokesman 
called the Bush speech “little short of declaring war against the 
DPRK” and accused the US Administration of “political immaturity 
and moral leprosy.”15 North-South relations, having already lost a 
great deal of momentum since the summer of 2000, were dampened 
considerably by the Bush Administration’s statements. It took a visit 
to Pyongyang by Kim Dae Jung’s special envoy Lim Dong Won in 
early April to get inter-Korean dialogue restarted. On April 28, 
Pyongyang agreed to resume reunion meetings of separated family 
members and to move forward with high-level contacts and economic 
cooperation. On August 11-14 the first ministerial-level North-South 
meetings in nearly a year took place in Seoul. At the same time, the 
two sides marked the 57th anniversary of liberation from Japanese 
13Samuel S. Kim, “North Korea in 2000,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 1 (January/ 
February, 2001), p. 20.
14 “North Korea Undergoing Economic Reform,” Chosun Ilbo (July 26, 2002); 
“Stitch by stitch to a different world,” The Economist, July 27, 2002, pp. 24 26.
15 “DPRK Denounces Bush’s Charges: Statement of FM Spokesman on Bush’s 
State of the Union Address,” People’s Korea, February 9, 2002, p. 1. The response 
is also available online as “Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry Slams Bush’s 
Accusations,” Korean Central News Agency, January 31, 2002, http://www.kcna. 
co.jp/calendar/january.
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colonial rule on August 15th with an unprecedented joint celebration, 
including the visit of more than 100 North Korean delegates to Seoul.16 
Washington-Pyongyang relations also showed signs of a thaw in 
late July and early August 2002, when Secretary of State Colin Powell 
met briefly with North Korea’s foreign minister at an ASEAN 
meeting in Brunei, and the Bush Administration sent Jack L. Pritchard 
as its first official envoy to the DPRK. Pritchard, who had met with 
Pyongyang’s ambassador to the UN several weeks earlier in New 
York, went to North Korea in early August for the ceremony marking 
the start of construction on the first light-water nuclear reactor to be 
built by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization 
(KEDO), the US-South Korean-Japanese consortium formed under 
the auspices of the 1994 Agreed Framework.17 Moreover, on the 
DPRK-Japan side, Prime Minister Koizumi’s unprecedented summit 
meeting with Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang in September, where Kim 
made his extraordinary admission that North Korea had abducted over 
a dozen Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, seemed at first to 
open up a new era in Japan-North Korea relations and start the two 
countries on the road to normalization.18 Kim Jong Il’s revelations, 
presumably intended to clear the path for DPRK-Japan normalization, 
had the opposite effect: The Japanese media and public responded to 
these revelations with such feelings of hostility toward North Korea 
that the “abduction issue” became a major impediment to improved 
ties between North Korea and Japan. 
The belated and tentative moves toward re-starting US-DPRK 
dialogue in late summer and early fall 2002 were dramatically 
derailed by the “Kelly revelations” of October. On October 5th, 
16 “Inter-Korean Festival Kicks Off in Seoul,” Korea Times, August 14, 2002, p. 1.
17 “Work Starts on North Korea’s US-Backed Nuclear Plant,” New York Times, 
August 8, 2002, p. A14.
18Howard W. French, “North Koreans Sign Agreement with Japanese,” New York 
Times, September 18, 2002, p. A1.
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Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly visited Pyongyang to meet 
with DPRK foreign ministry officials. To the North Koreans great 
surprise, Kelly presented them with evidence that North Korea had 
been secretly pursuing a program to develop highly enriched uranium 
(HEU), whose only purpose could be the manufacture of nuclear 
weapons.19 According to US accounts (North Korea publicly neither 
confirmed nor denied the accusation), the DPRK officials acknowledged 
the existence of this program and declared their right to possess such 
weapons. While it could be argued that the HEU program was technically 
not a violation of the Agreed Framework, as it only covered the 
plutonium program, this was clearly a violation of the spirit if not the 
letter of the agreement, and did directly violate the Joint Declaration of 
South and North Korea on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 
North Korea, for its part, accused the US of failing to abide by 
the Agreed Framework through its slowness in lifting the economic 
embargo against the DPRK, not removing North Korea from the State 
Department’s list of countries that supported terrorism, and failing to 
move with due haste on the construction of light-water reactors. The 
two countries were at an impasse. The US insisted that Pyongyang 
cease all of its nuclear-related activities before there could be any new 
negotiations, and in November Washington suspended deliveries of 
fuel oil to North Korea as required under the Agreed Framework. This 
was followed by a rapidly escalating set of moves on the part of North 
Korea toward re-starting its plutonium program, frozen by the 1994 
Agreement: Pyongyang announced its intention to re-open its nuclear 
power plant at Yongbyon, expelled International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) inspectors at the end of December 2002, announced 
its withdrawal from the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 
2003, and began to remove spent nuclear fuel rods from storage in 
19US State Department Press Statement, “North Korean Nuclear Program,” October 
16, 2002, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/14423pf/htm.
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February  the latter an act which had brought the US and North Korea 
to the brink of war in 1994. 
While the crisis in US-DPRK relations deepened in 2003, North- 
South relations continued to move forward. Indeed, a distinctive 
aspect of the 2002-3 crisis was the common ground Pyongyang could 
find with the Seoul government in criticizing the American approach 
to Korea. This was the reverse of the 1993-4 crisis, in which the ROK 
government of Kim Young-Sam deeply feared US-DPRK “collusion” 
at the expense of South Korea’s national interest. This is not to say that 
Seoul-Pyongyang relations became cordial or that Seoul suddenly 
broke its ties with Washington; Seoul decried North Korea’s deve-
lopment of nuclear weapons, and Pyongyang attacked the Roh 
Moo-hyun government for agreeing to send South Korean troops to 
Iraq.20 Roh visited Washington in May, and he and President Bush 
tried to put a unified face on their policy toward North Korea; 
Pyongyang condemned the Roh-Bush joint statement as “a perfidious 
act which runs counter to the basic spirit of the June 15 North-South 
Declaration.”21 However, various agreements and meetings between 
the ROK and DPRK went ahead despite the new nuclear crisis, 
including a seven-point agreement on inter-Korean economic 
relations, signed by the representatives of North and South Korea in 
Pyongyang in late May. The two sides agreed on the establishment of 
a special industrial zone in the North Korean city of Kaesong, 
reconnection of east and west coast railway lines, and other joint 
projects.22 For its part, the US proposed a multilateral forum to resolve 
20 “Pyongyang Hits Seoul’s Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq,” People’s Korea, 
April 22, 2003, p. 1.
21 “North, South Conclude 7-Point Agreement in Inter-Korean Economic Talks,” 
People’s Korea, May 31, 2003, p. 1.
22 “Fifth Meeting of North-South Committee for Promotion of Economic 
Cooperation Concludes,” Choson t’ongsin (Korea Central News Agency), May 
24, 2003, http:// www.kcna.co.jp/ index-k.htm.
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the new nuclear issue, a six-way dialogue among North and South 
Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the US. The Six-Party Talks began 
in Beijing in April 2003. 
Two Koreas, Six Parties, One Superpower
In the midst of this impasse in US-North Korean relations, 
George W. Bush was elected to a second term as US President. North 
Korea seemed to find the second Bush Administration just as hostile 
as the first, if not more so. Pyongyang seized upon Condoleezza 
Rice’s reference to North Korea as an “outpost of tyranny” in her 
inauguration speech as the new Secretary of State, claiming that this 
and other statements proved that the “true intention of the second-term 
Bush Administration is not only to further its policy to isolate and 
stifle the DPRK pursued by the first-term office but to escalate it.” On 
February 10, 2005, the DPRK Foreign Ministry confirmed that North 
Korea had “manufactured nukes” and was now a “nuclear weapons 
state.” Nevertheless, North Korea insisted that nuclear weapons were 
purely for self-defense against a hostile United States, and the official 
Korea Central News Agency reiterated that “[t]he DPRK’s principled 
stand to solve the issue through dialogue and negotiations and its 
ultimate goal to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula remains 
unchanged.”23 In the meantime, until US attitudes and policy toward 
North Korea shifted to one of peaceful coexistence, the nuclear issue 
could not be resolved and the North Korea would stay out of the 
Six-Party Talks.24 North Korea thus blamed the United States for the 
suspension of the Six-Party Talks, but left the door open for their 
resumption.
23http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm, February 11, 2005.
24An Sang Nam, “Why North Korea Isn’t Talking,” Asian Times, June 11, 2005, 
http://atimesol.atimes.com/atimes/archives/6_11.2005.html.
Charles K. Armstrong   17
There were, however, indications that the second Bush Admi-
nistration, unlike the first, was serious about negotiating with the 
North Koreans. Christopher Hill, a career diplomat who had been a 
key negotiator for the Balkan crisis under Clinton, was appointed 
ambassador to Seoul and then, less than a year later, chief US 
representative to the Six-Party Talks. While the US engaged in official 
dialogue with North Korea in Beijing, a team led by Ambassador 
Joseph DeTrani pursued “informal” dialogue with North Korean 
representatives in New York. This helped to get the Six-Party Process 
back on track. In June 2005, the movement toward renewed US-DPRK 
formal dialogue rapidly picked up momentum. On June 10, President 
Bush met with ROK President Roh Moo-hyun in Washington. On 
June 17, as part of a South Korean delegation visiting Pyongyang for 
the fifth anniversary of the June 15 North-South Summit, ROK 
Unification Minister Chung Dong Young met with Kim Jong Il, and 
Kim conveyed to him North Korea’s desire to return to the Six-Party 
Talks by the end of July. Later, Minister Chung explained that South 
Korea had promised to supply electricity to the North in order to help 
resolve the nuclear issue, as North Korea had long insisted that its 
nuclear program was primarily intended to alleviate its severe energy 
shortages.25 Finally, on July 10, North Korea announced that it would 
return to the talks. Secretary Rice insisted that the US position had not 
changed: “We are not talking about enhancement of the current 
proposal,” that is, the proposal of June 2004.26 
During the 13 months in which the talks had been suspended, 
both the United States and North Korea insisted they would not move 
from their respective positions. However, close reading of each side’s 
25 Joel Brinkley, “South Korea Offers Power if North Quits Arms Program,” New 
York Times, July 13, 2005, p. A6.
26 Joel Brinkley, “Setting the Table for North Korea’s Return,” New York Times, 
July 11, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/11/international/asia/11assess. 
htm.
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rhetoric and actions during that time suggested otherwise. North 
Korea had begun to speak of “peaceful coexistence” rather than 
outright normalization or a peace agreement in the immediate future; 
the United States referred to North Korea’s “sovereignty” and quietly 
pursued bilateral discussions with the DPRK both in New York and 
Beijing. As the talks began on July 25, North Korean and American 
diplomats met in Beijing for extensive one-on-one discussions, 
despite the longstanding US resistance to bilateral talks. Ambassador 
Hill described a step-by-step process of each side working 
simultaneously to resolve the nuclear standoff, rather than North 
Korea conceding everything up front; he described this as “words for 
words and actions for actions,” exactly the phrase the North Koreans 
had long used. Hill’s North Korean counterpart, chief negotiator Kim 
Kye Gwan, opened his remarks with a more conciliatory, less 
belligerent tone than earlier North Korean statements.27 When the six 
parties met for a fourth round of talks in September, they produced for 
the first time a joint statement on the denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula.28 The six-point statement was notable for its vagueness; 
issues of procedure, much less implementation, were far from 
resolved, and little progress was made toward resolution in the fifth 
round, held in early November.29 Nevertheless, the very existence of 
such talks signified a considerable improvement in US-North Korean 
relations since the tense days of late 2002 and early 2003, when  as in 
the 1993 4 crisis  the two seemed on the verge of military confrontation. 
As the world’s sole superpower and the most important external 
presence on the Korean Peninsula, the US was an essential factor in 
27 Jim Yardley and David E. Sanger, “US Tries a New Approach in Talks with North 
Korea,” New York Times, July 27, 2005, p. A10.
28 “Full Text of Joint Statement from Six-way Nuclear Talks,” Vantage Point 
(October, 2005), p. 11.
29 Joseph Kahn, “North Korea and US Spar, Causing Talks to Stall,” New York 
Times, November 12, 2005, p. A6.
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any resolution of the inter-Korean conflict. North-South Korean 
relations could not proceed very far without US cooperation and 
encouragement. Despite important differences, by the end of 2005, 
after three years of growing divergence, the US and South Korea were 
again converging on how to approach North Korea. However, it 
remains to be seen how far this convergence will proceed. Without a 
breakthrough in the North Korean nuclear crisis, US-DPRK relations 
cannot move toward normalization, and consequently inter-Korean 
relations will remain constrained.
Inter-Korean Relations toward the Future
Inter-Korean relations have come a long way since the days of 
mutually exclusive antagonism in the post-Korean War period. 
Nevertheless, relations remain quite limited, and the two sides have 
only moved toward a situation of de facto mutual recognition, 
coexistence, and emerging interdependence. Substantial interdependence, 
much less integration, has yet to occur. Unification remains a distant 
possibility, and at present neither North nor South Korea speaks much 
of unification in the near future. Since the June 2000 summit, both 
sides have acknowledged that unification is likely to be a long, gradual 
process. For the South, sudden unification could have powerful, 
disruptive near-term consequences in its economy and society, 
turning back decades of hard-earned economic growth and creating 
social turmoil. For the North, the last thing its leaders want is a 
German-style absorption by the South, which would mean the end of 
their system and their privileged position in it. Additionally, for all of 
the surrounding countries in Northeast Asia, a gradually and 
peacefully integrated Korean Peninsula is far preferable to unification 
resulting from a sudden collapse of North Korea, with all the problems 
of instability, masses of refugees, and loose weapons that could 
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produce. 
Military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula has not ceased. 
The North and the South remain technically in a state of war with one 
another. They both maintain enormous conventional forces facing 
each other across the DMZ, and it is increasingly likely that the North 
has nuclear weapons as well. Furthermore, the presence of tens of 
thousands of American troops in the South, as well as American forces 
elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific that could be deployed to the Korean 
Peninsula should war break out, help make Korea one of the most 
potentially dangerous military flashpoints on earth. Nevertheless, 
while the two Koreas are not officially at peace, the chances of either 
side going to war with the other have lessened as ties between them 
have gradually grown. In a small but symbolic gesture, the ROK 
Ministry of National Defense no longer refers to the North Korea as 
the “main enemy” in its most recent White Paper.30 This gradual thaw 
in the military confrontation occurs in the midst of growing economic 
interaction and exchange within the Korean Peninsula, and much 
more extensively among the countries of Northeast Asia, including 
South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan. A less confrontational, more 
cooperative and increasingly integrated Korean Peninsula is in the 
interest of all the countries of the region, above all the Koreans 
themselves.
30 Jung Sung-ki, “English Defense Paper Issued,” Korea Times, May 15, 2005, 
http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/nation/200505/kt2005051517390011990.htm. 
For the text of the White Paper, see www.mnd.go.kr.
